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T
he aging of the Canadian
population, as the oldest baby-
boomers enter their 60s, has
sparked a much greater focus on the
labour-market behaviour of older
workers and the retirement income
available to them. In particular,
employer-sponsored, defined-benefit
pension plans traditionally have been
an important source of retirement
income. With their promise of
predetermined benefits based on
income and years of service, defined-
benefit plans have been popular
among workers. These plans shift the
risks associated with asset returns and
(perhaps more importantly)
uncertain longevity onto the
employer.
Nevertheless, recent developments have called
into question the relative merits of defined-
benefit plans. Many appear to be struggling to
meet pension commitments, and these plans are
expected to be further weakened by the
impending retirement of more and more baby
boomers.1 Consequently, employers increasingly
are reluctant to embrace or continue participating
in defined-benefit pension plans.
Economists and policymakers have also
criticized defined-benefit pension plans for the
incentives they often create for workers to enter
early retirement. From an employer’s perspective,
however, these incentives can be an important
tool in achieving worker-retention and retirement
objectives. The defined-benefit plan’s advantage to
employers is its ability to provide employees with
incentives to leave a firm at a time that it is in the
firm’s best interest.
This paper examines various provisions
common to defined-benefit pension plans that
influence individuals’ work and retirement
decisions. These arrangements, whether or not
they are in the best interest of employers or
workers today, may bring down employment and
participation rates among older workers. Not only
is this a concern for employers, but also for
policymakers projecting the implications of the
babyboomers’ mass retirement from the labour
force. 
The analysis is based on a publicly available
simulation model constructed by the author.
Details of the model, designed for use with
Microsoft Excel, are provided in the Appendix of
this paper.
In the model, the approximate lifetime
retirement benefits available to participants in
various existing Canadian defined-benefit pension
plans can be derived for each possible retirement
age. Plans considered include the Ontario
Teachers’ Pension Plan, the Federal Public Service
Pension Plan, the Ford Canada — Canadian Auto
Workers pension plan and the pension plan
covering Steelworkers at Stelco Canada, now U.S.
Steel Canada. Users of the model can readily view
the incentives or disincentives for retirement
created by these pension plans. What appears
common to these plans are clear incentives to
enter retirement as soon as a person is eligible for
unreduced retirement benefits.
I begin by providing some background
regarding the extent to which older individuals
are participating in the labour force and
participating in defined-benefit pension plans. I
then explain the measures used to describe the
various incentives found in defined-benefit plans.
This is followed by a series of simulations that
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1 According to the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (2007), 78 percent of plans were less than fully funded on a solvency basis at
their last valuation date ranging from July 2003 to June 2006.  The median solvency ratio was 86 percent. However, its report noted that
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demonstrate how the existing provisions of
pension plans in Canada may influence
retirement decisions. I then discuss some evidence
suggesting these pension incentives have an
important influence on retirement decisions.
Finally, I place this evidence in the context of the
various other factors influencing the retirement
decision. 
Background — Pensions and the
Canadian Labour Market
It is useful to begin with an overview of the long-
run trends in employment and reliance on
retirement pensions among older individuals.
Typically, studies of older workers have focused
on men because their employment rates
traditionally have been much higher than those of
women. As shown in Figure 1, the employment
rates of men aged 55 to 69 fell steadily
throughout the late 1970s, 1980s and into the
mid-1990s. By 1995, the employment rate of
men age 55-59 was only 65 percent compared to
81 percent in 1976. The employment rate of men
aged 60-64 is consistently lower than younger
men, and was only 40 percent in 1995 compared
to 64 percent in 1976. More recently,
employment in this group has been trending
upward for the past decade, reaching 50 percent
among 60-to-64-year-old men in 2006 compared
to 40 percent in 1996. Schirle (2007) suggests
that a large part of the recent upward trend in
men’s employment rates relates to older husbands’
preferences to spend leisure time in retirement
with their wives. The employment rates of older
women (see Figure 2) have increased over the past
decade, reaching 35 percent among women 60-64
in 2006, compared to 22 percent in 1996. 
How are these trends related to defined-benefit
pension plan incentives to retire early?
Participation in such plans has fallen steadily
since the early 1980s, as shown in Figure 3.
While 36 percent of the labour force belonged to
a defined-benefit plan in 1978, only 26 percent
was covered in 2006.2 Most of this decline
occurred during the 1990s and reflects a drop in
plan coverage across all age groups. It is possible
that this more recent decline in defined-benefit
plan coverage explains some portion of recent
increases in employment among older men
requiring income security. 
Meanwhile, there has been a slight increase in
worker participation in the other common
retirement schemes including defined-
contribution plans. Under this approach, the
income received upon retirement depends on the
amount of money an employer and employee
have contributed, and how these funds have been
invested. Defined-contribution plans are popular
among workers who wish to exercise choice about
how much they want to contribute and the
direction of their retirement portfolio. Still, an
increase in participation in defined-contribution
plans from two percent in 1982 to five percent in
2006 has not been large enough to prevent an
overall participation decline in registered pension
plans over that same period.3
Poterba, Venti and Wise (2007) have found a
similar downward trend in defined-benefit
pension plan coverage in the United States.
Unlike Canada, however, a remarkable US growth
in defined-contribution plans (primarily in the
form of 401(k) plans) has been large enough to
result in an overall increase in pension coverage.4
In 1990, 38 percent of US private sector
employees participated in a pension plan; in
C.D. Howe Institute
2 The trends presented in Figure 3 are consistent with recent trends presented by Morissette and Ostrovsky (2007). Using
the Longitudinal Administrative Databank, they found that registered pension plan coverage of men aged 35 to 54 (tax
filers) fell from 39.2 percent in 1991 to 32.8 percent in 2004. Men aged 35 to 54 represent a large portion of the total labour
force aged 15 to 69. They also found a drop in coverage among men aged 25 to 34, falling from 25.5 percent in 1991 to 21.4
percent in 2004.
3 Registered pension plans refer to any form of trust that provides pension benefits upon retirement. They are registered
with the Canada Revenue Agency, making both employer and employee contributions tax deductible.
4 This is a difficult comparison to make as Canadian statistics do not include employer group RRSP arrangements, which
may be comparable to 401(k) plans in the United States.Commentary 262 | 3
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2003, the participation rate had grown to 48
percent.
Clearly, registered pension plans, whether
defined-benefit or defined-contribution, are an
important source of income for Canadian retirees.
Among 65-year-old Canadians, nearly one-half
receive some sort of registered pension plan
benefits.5 Just over 10 percent of Canadians age
55 received pension income in 2003.6 According
to Wannell (2007), pension benefits accounted
for almost two-thirds of post-retirement income
among young pensioners (aged 50 to 59).
Pescarus and Rivard (2005) have found that
among families with a member aged 50 to 64
covered by a registered pension plan, 35 percent
of the member’s assets were held in his/her
pension, while the family home represented only
26 percent and RRSPs 10 percent.
Clearly, the existence and structure of pension
plans have a major influence on retirement
decisions. According to Milligan and Schirle
(2007), nearly 50 percent of retirees aged 55 to
69 report entering retirement because they had
completed enough years of service to qualify for
their pension. Among 55-to-59-year-old retirees,
25 percent cited early retirement incentives as a
reason for entering retirement.
There are many ways for an employer to
structure a defined-benefit pension plan and
provide a secure income to retirees. The next
section examines various ways of structuring these
plans. In particular, I focus on how plan
provisions can create incentives for employees to
C.D. Howe Institute
5 Based on author’s calculations from the Statistics Canada 2003 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) public use
files. SLID includes benefits from registered pension plans and RRIFs in this definition of pensions.
6 Ibid.
Figure 3:  Percentage of the Labour Force Aged 15 to 69 Covered 
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continue working or enter retirement at any given
age.
Retirement Incentives in Pension
Plans
Measurement of Retirement Incentives
There are three commonly used measures to
describe the incentives found in defined-benefit
and other pension plans: 
￿ The value of initial benefits upon retirement;
￿ The discounted present value of lifetime
retirement benefits upon retirement; and
￿ The one-year accrual value.
The first measure, the value of initial benefits
received upon retirement, is the cash amount
received in the first year of retirement. As a purely
fictional and simple example, consider the profile
shown in Figure 4. (This is the default profile
provided by the simulation model upon opening
the program). The amounts for each age represent
the initial cash value of the benefit received by
this individual when he/she retires. In this
example, if this individual were to retire at age 50,
he/she would receive $11,000 in the first year.
That initial benefit is increased by $1,000 for
each year of delayed retirement.
But, if the individual chooses to wait at least
five years and retire between the ages of 55 and
59, he/she receives a $2,000 bonus added to their
annual pension amount. That is, someone retiring
at 54 would receive $15,000 in the first year
consisting of $11,000 plus $4,000 for four
additional years. However, the same person would
receive an $18,000 annual benefit if he/she
waited to retire at 55 ($11,000 plus $5,000 for
five years plus $2,000 for waiting until 55).
From the perspective of a 50-year-old who is
contemplating when to retire, such a scenario
demonstrates when he/she would receive the
largest benefits. The profile is of incredibly
limited value, however, in determining the
optimal age at which to retire. Important to
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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recognize here, these cash amounts — when
viewed from the perspective of a 50-year-old —
do not account for relative increases in consumer
prices or the relative size of this pension benefit to
potential wage earnings in the future. More
importantly, the amount only represents the
annual benefit provided rather than the total
value of the pension benefits received over a
lifetime.7
The second measure, the discounted present
value of lifetime retirement benefits is the more
important and informative measure when judging
retirement incentives. For the models used in this
paper, the discounted present value is represented
by the following formula.
(1)
In equation (1), yt represents the real value of
retirement benefits in each year (t), and depends
on the chosen age of retirement (r).8 These
annual amounts are combined over the person’s
expected lifetime, from his/her current age (c)
until the last year of life under consideration (T).
The amounts in each year are discounted for time
preferences (β = 1/(1+i) where i is a risk-free
interest rate) and the probability of surviving
until each year t, given that the individual has
survived to his/her current age c (π(t|c)). 
When judging whether to retire, an individual
at age c can calculate this discounted present
value for each possible future retirement age. As
the discounted present value equals the total
retirement wealth an individual can expect to
receive, people should tend to choose a retirement
age that maximizes that wealth. One expects that
individuals holding sufficient retirement wealth
(all else equal) would choose to spend fewer years
in the labour force and retire earlier than their less
wealthy counterparts. Therefore, a higher level of
wealth implies a positive incentive to retire. 
For the simple fictional pension plan benefits
represented in Figure 4, the profile of an
individual’s discounted present value of benefits at
each retirement age is provided in Figure 5.9 At
50, the individual expects to receive total pension
benefits valued at more than $180,000. If,
however, he/she waited until 59 to retire, the
discounted present value increases to more than
$270,000. Under most plans, this accrual in
retirement wealth occurs for extra years of service.
Here, the steep increases in wealth for retirement
between 55 and 59 are due to the early retirement
bonus. 
The discounted present value begins to fall for
retirement after 59 because the retirement bonus
is no longer available and the nominal increases in
initial benefits ($1,000 per year) are not enough
to compensate for the delay in receiving a
pension, given a shorter expected remaining
lifespan. Using this measure of retirement
incentives, it would appear this individual has a
strong incentive to retire at 59, before
experiencing an overall drop in pension wealth. 
The prospect of future pension wealth through
delayed retirement will exist as long as retirement
benefits depend on the age of retirement and/or
years of service. In this way, the accrual of
pension wealth influences the optimal timing of
retirement. This study captures this incentive
effect from defined-benefit pension plans using a
one-year accrual measure.10
A one-year accrual represents the amount of
retirement wealth an individual can gain if
C.D. Howe Institute
7 This nominal benefit may be important if benefits are not adequate to preserve the individual’s expected standard of living. This is likely
important for low-wage or low-seniority workers. This study focuses on those workers for whom retirement is considered a financially
feasible option.
8 A “real” value reflects individual purchasing power and remains constant over time if pension benefits are indexed to inflation or a
comparable cost of living index.
9 The fictional plan assumes the initial pension benefit is fully indexed to inflation. The simulation model incorporates survival probabilities
based on Statistics Canada’s Life Tables (2002).
10 As a reference point, note that retirement wealth from a defined-contribution pension plan usually continues to rise with age depending on
the asset returns and contributions made by employers and employees relative to the cost of living increases and survival probabilities.
Defined-contribution plans will not have the discontinuities we find in typical defined-benefit pension plans and are not designed for use
by employers in the employment contract as a tool for planning worker retention.
 
) ( ) | (







− = π βCommentary 262 | 7
retirement is delayed for one year. It is derived
directly from the discounted present value
calculations as OYArc = DPV(r+1)c - DPVrc .
This formula represents the amount of retirement
wealth a person would gain by delaying
retirement from age r to age r+1 and is often used
to describe the pension plan incentives an
individual has at any given point in his/her career
to work at least one more year.
Generally, one might expect an individual to
have the greatest incentive to retire before the
accrual of benefits becomes negative. In Figure 6,
one sees that while the accrual of retirement
wealth remains positive initially in the fictional
pension plan, it falls steadily from $5,000 to
almost zero with each year of delayed retirement
between 50 and 53. At age 54, the accrual jumps
to nearly $25,000 since delaying retirement to 55
allows the individual to benefit from the
retirement bonus. 
At 58, the individual gains only a smaller
amount of wealth (over $10,000) by delaying
retirement to 59, but at 59 the individual begins
to lose wealth by delaying retirement. Therefore,
at 59, the worker has a greater and more obvious
financial incentive to enter retirement.11 But used
in this manner, the one-year accrual can be
deceiving. As will be seen in the next section,
many pension plans are structured such that a
negative accrual may occur at a relatively early
retirement age. However, there are subsequent
positive accruals, reflecting important
discontinuities in the discounted present value of
retirement benefits. A forward-looking individual
would rely more heavily on the discounted
present values when deciding the financially best
retirement age.
As the discounted present value and one-year
accrual measures are the more useful guides to
incentives, the following section will rely
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
11 Loosely speaking, the one-year accrual can be thought of as the amount a person would receive in addition to his/her current wages for
continuing to work another year. A larger accrual then results in greater incentive to work for the year. A negative accrual results in a greater
incentive to enter retirement.
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12 All results of this paper can be replicated using the publicly available simulation model.
13 This assumption matters for the level of benefits in the PSPP and OTPP plans, but not the resulting incentives discussed here. Average
earnings of teachers and public servants are likely higher than those of workers in the manufacturing sector. For the purposes of illustrating
the mechanisms at work in these plans, I have assumed the same salary across all examples.
primarily on these indicators when discussing the
incentives of various pension plans.12
Early Retirment Incentives Found in Existing
Defined-Benefit Plans.
In this section, I use the simulation model to
show how pension plans in Canada have worked
to create retirement incentives or disincentives.
Four plans are discussed — the Ontario Teachers’
Pension Plan (OTPP), the Federal Public Service
Pension Plan (PSPP), the pension plan covering
CAW members at Ford Canada and that covering
Steelworkers at what used to be Stelco Canada.
The structure of these plans for the simulation
model, described in more detail in the appendix,
relies heavily on information collected by Pescarus
and Rivard (2005). 
To begin, I examine the retirement incentives
in each pension plan for a 50-year-old with 25
years of seniority. It is assumed this individual
earns approximately $40,000 per year and that
this salary is the highest level of career earnings.13
Figure 7 illustrates the discounted present value of
retirement benefits under each pension plan at
each possible retirement age for this individual. 
Under the PSPP, pension benefits are calculated
as a percentage of earnings multiplied by years of
service, to a maximum of 35 years. If the
individual retired at 50, he/she would receive
actuarially reduced benefits. With 25 years of
seniority, this individual’s benefits are reduced by
25 percent — 5 percent for each year under 30
years seniority. Each year the individual delays
retirement, he/she gains in two ways: by a
reduction in this actuarial penalty and by extra
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Note:  These profiles represent the discounted present value of lifetime retirement benefits for a 50-year-old worker with 25 years seniority,


































































































Figure 7:  Discounted Present Value of Retirement Benefits, by Age of Retirement| 10 Commentary 262
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years of service applied to the basic benefit. This
is easily calculated in Figure 8, where the one-year
accrual of retirement benefits is provided. 
At 55, the same PSPP member achieves a
maximum discounted present value of benefits.
At that age, the individual has enough seniority to
begin receiving an unreduced benefit. If the
worker chose to delay retirement one more year
after 55, he/she would actually lose some
retirement wealth and the one-year accrual
becomes negative. Although extra years of service
will increase the annual benefit, that increase is
insufficient to compensate the individual for the
lost years of receiving benefits from age 55. 
At 60, the accruals under
PSPP turn even more sharply
negative as the individual
reaches 35 years of seniority
and his/her extra years of
service do not translate into
higher benefits. This results in
even greater incentives to retire
sooner rather than later. The
larger one-year accrual in
Figure 8 at 65 reflects the
integration of the PSPP with
the Canada Pension Plan.
The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan has similar
features creating incentives for early retirement.
For the same 50-year-old individual with 25 years
seniority, retirement at 50 is penalized by an
actuarial reduction of 2.5 percent for each point
under the 85 factor (age plus years of service). For
the next five years, each year of delayed
retirement increases the individual’s benefits by
five percent. At 55, like under the PSPP, the
individual has no obvious incentive to continue
working since he/she is now eligible to receive
unreduced benefits, having reached the 85 factor.
Any further increases in benefits for years of
service do not adequately compensate for the
years of forgone pension payments. Similar to the
PSPP, the OTPP is integrated with the Canada
Pension Plan, reducing benefit amounts at 65 and
beyond. 
The private sector pension plans provide the
most striking early retirement incentives. The
Steelworkers’ plan provides the highest retirement
wealth at 52, the earliest age at which a plan
member can enjoy unreduced benefits if they
achieved a 75 factor (age plus years of service).
(For simplicity, it has been assumed that
individuals will not retire before they are eligible
to collect retirement benefits.) As early retirement
is no longer penalized and later retirements are
not rewarded with actuarial increases, any
additional years of seniority from delayed
retirement do not result in increases in benefits
large enough to compensate the individual for the
years of forgone benefits.
The Ford Canada plan, which provides a flat
benefit based on years of
seniority, has similar
incentives. The same worker is
eligible for unreduced benefits
at 55, having achieved enough
points for the 80 factor (age
plus years of service). This
individual, however, achieves
maximum retirement wealth at
60 when, with more than 30
years of service, he/she is
eligible for Ford’s “30-n-out”
program. This program
provides a substantial monthly top-up benefit to
any employee retiring between 60 and 65 with
more than 30 years of seniority. After 65, the
program is no longer available. Initial benefit
levels for retirement after 65 are much lower and
accruals turn sharply negative at 65, leaving
individuals with few incentives to continue
working.
In each of these examples, the first year when
individuals can receive unreduced pension
benefits is also a year in which they have
substantial incentives to retire. To further
illustrate this point, the incentives contained in
the pension plans are reproduced in Figures 9 and
10 for individuals considering retirement at 50
with only 15 years of seniority. 
In each of these profiles, the individual has an
incentive to retire at the first age of unreduced
benefits. For the PSPP, this occurs at 60 (with
only 25 years seniority). The same individual
In each of these
examples, the first year
when individuals can
receive unreduced
pension benefits is also 
a year in which they
have substantial
incentives to retire.Commentary 262 | 11






















































Figure 8:  One -Year Accrual of Retirement Benefits, by Age of Retirement
Note:  These profiles represent the accrual of retirement wealth achieved by delaying retirement by one year, for each potential age of
















































































































Figure 9:  Discouted Present Value of Retirement Benefits, by Age of Retirement
Note:  These profiles represent the discounted present value of lifetime retirement benefits for a 50-year-old worker with 15 years seniority,
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Figure 10:  One-Year Accrual of Retirement Benefits, by Age of Retirement
Note:  These profiles represent the accrual of retirement wealth achieved by delaying retirement by one year, for each potential age of
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under OTPP also would reach the first age of
unreduced benefits at 60 as this is when they have
achieved enough points for the 85 factor (60
years of age plus 25 years service). For the
Steelworkers, who require a 75 factor for
unreduced benefits, the individual has an
incentive to retire at 55 with 20 years of service. 
The Ford plan is similar as this individual sees a
large jump in retirement benefits at 58 — the
first year of unreduced benefits with an 80 factor.
The present value of lifetime benefits falls
thereafter, except in the year the Ford worker
turns 65. This is the only year he/she would be
eligible for the top-up benefit under the 30-n-out
plan.
It is worth emphasizing the factors at work in
creating these early-retirement incentives. The
greatest benefit that can be achieved by delaying
retirement under these plans is the smaller
actuarial reduction applied to the initial benefit
amounts. Once a worker reaches the retirement
age with unreduced benefits, the additional
benefits from extra years of service are not
adequate to financially compensate for the years
of forgone retirement benefits, without an
incremental benefit. Note this incremental benefit
could be achieved with an actuarial increase in
benefits for delayed retirement.
Plans such as the PSPP create further
disincentives for delayed retirement by placing a
maximum on years of service that will raise
pension benefits. Plans such as the Ford pension
plan create some incentives to continue work by
giving a bonus for retirement at an age after that
of unreduced benefits. Such provisions, of course,
provide incentives to retire as soon as the bonus is
available and disincentives to enter retirement
thereafter.
The Effects of Pensions Incentives on
Retirement Behavior
It remains to ask a critical question: How do
individuals respond to the financial incentives for
retirement discussed here? If they do respond by
taking early retirement, what is the relative
importance of these incentives among the various
factors that influence retirement decisions? 
The literature examining the incentives
contained in public pensions is quite extensive
(see Milligan 2005 and Milligan and Schirle
2006), and generally suggests individuals will take
advantage of the types of retirement incentives
discussed in the previous section. In an influential
paper, Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2004)
examine the effect of Canada’s income security
programs on retirement behaviour, using the
retirement wealth and accrual measures described
in this study. They find that retirement wealth has
a positive and significant effect on early
retirement decisions and that, specifically, the
accrual of wealth for delayed retirement has the
expected negative effect on the likelihood of
entering retirement. Some of their estimates
suggest a $1,000 accrual increase is associated
with a two-percentage-point decline in retirement
rates.14
It is unclear whether one can expect employer-
provided pension plans to have an impact similar
to public pensions. Evidence of the effects of
employer-provided pension plans has been
limited, especially in Canada, largely due to a lack
of adequate data sets. Pesando and Gunderson
(1988 and 1991) map out pension wealth profiles
for common employer-provided pensions in
Canada, with the goal of identifying the
incentives to continue working created by the
structure of the pension plans. They suggest the
absence of actuarial increases or accrual in
benefits for additional years of service would
create early retirement incentives — potentially
serving as a substitute for mandatory retirement. 
In a later work, Pesando and Gunderson (1991)
found that pension wealth is likely to decline after
the age at which unreduced pension benefits are
available. Pesando, Gunderson and Shum (1992)
also document the work and retirement incentives
contained in defined-benefit pension plans and
provide evidence that unionized workers who
anticipate positive changes in the defined-benefit
14 Their study refers to a US$1,000 increase, in 1998 constant dollars.Commentary 262 | 15
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formulas are likely to postpone retirement until a
new contract is negotiated. In these studies,
however, the authors did not actually estimate the
effects of such provisions on retirement behaviour.
In a US study, Stock and Wise (1990) use data
from a large Fortune 500 firm to examine the
retirement incentive effects of defined-benefit
pension plan provisions.15 This firm’s pension
benefit formula is a simple function of years of
service and final wages. There are early retirement
actuarially reduced benefits for retirements from
50 to 54; there are less than actuarially reduced
benefits available for retirements from 55 to 65;
and the person is entitled to unreduced benefits at
60 if he/she has 30 years of service. All
beneficiaries have benefits reduced after age 65,
depending on their Social Security entitlement. 
Under this plan, the discounted present value
of retirement benefits peaks at 55 when benefits
are no longer subject to the full actuarial
reduction, similar to the plans discussed in the
previous section. The results of the study suggest
that a substantial portion of individuals would
delay retirement if the early retirement provisions
were applied at older ages. 
Interestingly, switching from a defined-benefit
plan to a defined-contribution plan is expected to
increase retirement rates at younger ages. Results
from Stock and Wise (1990) suggest that as there
is no need to stay to receive “retirement bonuses,”
individuals will retire earlier. They point out that
these results are consistent with the view that the
defined-benefit plan keeps employees in the firm
until certain ages and then provides an incentive
to leave.
In another US study, Coile and Gruber (2000)
use a simpler model to estimate the effect of
pension plan and social security incentives on
retirement decisions. While difficult to separately
identify the effects of public and private pensions,
they found that incentives from Social Security
had important effects on retirement decisions.
Their results, however, suggest that individuals are
less responsive to changes in pension incentives
than to changes in Social Security incentives. 
Canadian evidence of the effects of pension
incentives is more limited. Gunderson, Hyatt and
Pesando (1992) have provided evidence
suggesting early retirement provisions influence
retirement decisions. Schirle (2006) provides
more recent Canadian evidence suggesting
individuals respond to both public pension and
private pension early retirement incentives. 
Overall, the literature examining pension
incentives suggests individuals will respond to
financial incentives when making retirement
decisions. However, it remains to be determined
what is the relative importance of these incentives
in the retirement decision? While 25 percent of
retirees aged 55 to 59 in one study stated that
they retired because their employer offered an
early retirement incentive, retirees are more likely
to report they retired because of health reasons or
because they simply wanted to stop working
(Milligan and Schirle 2007).16
There is also a large body of literature
examining these other factors that influence
retirement decisions. For example, Canadian
evidence from Campolieti (2002) demonstrates
that disability has a large negative effect on labour
force participation. Evidence from Schirle (2006)
suggests poor health increases the likelihood of
entering retirement by 20 percentage points. US
literature provides similar conclusions and
suggests that the availability of retiree health
insurance is an important consideration for early
retirement. As health deteriorates with age, some
workers may experience falling wages or increased
disutility of work, providing them with additional
incentives to retire. 
The incentives contained in defined-benefit
pension plans are thus only one factor to consider
15 Stock and Wise are often credited with developing the measures used in this paper. They use an “option value” measurement of continued
work to represent the amount an individual can gain in terms of the discounted present value of utility from income when retirement is
postponed until some optimal age. Our simple use of income rather than utility to describe these decisions effectively assumes individuals
are risk-neutral.
16 In this survey, these reasons for retirement were not mutually exclusive categories.| 16 Commentary 262
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in the retirement decision. One expects
individuals to respond to the inducements
discussed in this study. Specifically, one can
expect many early retirements when the present
value of retirement benefits reaches a maximum at
the first age of unreduced benefits. Other special
retirement provisions, such as Ford’s “30-n-out”
provisions, can be constructed to keep employees
with the firm past this first age of unreduced
benefits. Defined-contribution plans, on the other
hand, would not provide employers with the
tools, useful in their employment contracts, to
keep high seniority employees with the firm at
older ages.
Conclusion
The central goal of this study is to illustrate how
the structure of defined-benefit pension plans
may create incentives for workers to take early
retirement or continue working with an employer.
The examples used here — Ford Canada,
Steelworkers, the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan
and the Federal Public Service Pension Plan —
have significant provisions that provide
motivation for early retirement. In each of these
plans, individuals have inducements to retire at
the age when unreduced benefits are first
available. Without actuarial increases for delayed
retirement, any accrual in retirement benefits
associated with more years of service is unlikely to
adequately compensate the individual for the
years of forgone retirement benefits.
The Ford Canada plan best exemplifies how a
defined-benefit pension plan can be designed to
encourage workers to remain with the firm until a
particular age. A high-seniority worker that
qualifies for Ford’s “30-n-out” program has large
incentives to retire at 60 and not work beyond
that age. The use of penalties for early retirement,
such as those found in the Steelworkers’ plan for
workers under the 75 factor, can be used to retain
older workers while allowing some flexibility in
the choice of retirement age among its workers.
This study provides some additional insight
into the nature of retirement incentives for all
parties involved in pension plans, whether they be
employers, workers or policymakers. Ultimately,
the provisions of a defined-benefit pension plan
are the result of negotiations between an
employer and employees and should be thought
of as one part of an optimal contract between
these parties. This contract should reflect the
human resource needs of the employer and the
retirement preferences of employees. From the
firm’s perspective, the use of such contracts as part
of the compensation package can facilitate
worker-retention objectives. Employers should
regularly perform comprehensive analyses of their
plans to ensure they fit their long-term goals. 
From the worker’s perspective, a defined-benefit
pension plan provides a secure form of retirement
income and offers protection from the longevity
risk that is more easily absorbed by a large
employer. Difficulties may arise, however, when
there exist considerable differences in retirement
preferences among workers at different stages of
their career. It is difficult to negotiate a range of
pension options within a workplace to suit
various types of employees. It would be even
more difficult to alter pension plan provisions to
reflect changing employee preferences or
employer needs. 
Finally, while policymakers at the provincial
and federal levels may be very interested in the
retirement incentive effects of pension plan
provisions, interfering in any substantial way in
these contracts can only lead to inefficiencies in
the labour market. While it is the responsibility of
pension legislators to monitor pension funds and
ensure that pension obligations are met, the only
other role suggested here would be ensuring that
flexibility in pension arrangements, as it reflects
the preferences of workers and employers, is
protected.Commentary 262 | 17
Appendix — The Simulation of
Pension Plans
The models used here do not truly represent all
provisions of individuals’ pension plans and
should not be relied upon in determining
individual benefits. Rather, the models are
designed to exemplify how key provisions of
various plans matter in determining an
individual’s retirement wealth. The simulation





All benefits are viewed from the perspective of an
individual deciding whether to retire in 2007.
The individual assumes the benefit structure of
his/her pension plan will not change and that the
amounts that define a basic-benefit amount will
increase with inflation. The initial benefit
amount, if the individual retired immediately, is
stated in 2007 dollars.
Throughout, it is assumed that the individual
will not consider retiring unless he/she can
simultaneously begin receiving pension benefits.
The survival probabilities used are those for
men. It is assumed individuals have zero
probability of surviving past age 102. The survival
probabilities used in the model reflect the
probability of surviving to each age given that the
individual survived to the age of retirement under
consideration. 
The use of survival probabilities for women, for
the most part, would result in a higher discounted
present value of retirement benefits at each age,
given a longer life expectancy. 
The various pension plan provisions are
described below (closely following Pescarus and
Rivard 2005):
1. Ford Canada — Canadian Auto Workers
pension plan.
￿ This is a flat-benefit plan, with a fixed
retirement benefit linked to the individual’s
category of employment. The model here
assumes the benefit for an assembler, set at
$57.80 per month per year of service (2002
amounts).
￿ Individuals may receive benefits without
actuarial reduction as early as 55 with an 80
factor, or from 60 with an 85 factor. 
￿ At the time this model was developed, the
actuarial reduction and earliest possible
pension take-up age was not clear to the
author. I have assumed the earliest age for
pension take-up to be 55 years and an
actuarial reduction of 5 percent per year.
When retiring between 55 and 60, this
reduction applies to each year the individual is
under the 80 factor. When retiring at 60 or
older, this reduction applies to each year the
individual is under the 85 factor.
￿ Employees who retire between 60 and 65 with
at least 30 years of pensionable service can
receive a top-up benefit under a 30-n-out
program, set at $1,236 per month above the
basic benefit (2002 amount). 
￿ The model assumes pension benefits are
indexed to inflation.
￿ The model implicitly assumes there are no
future collective agreements that will change
retirement benefits.
2. The Steelworkers and Stelco Canada, now
U.S. Steel, pension plan
￿ This is a flat-benefit plan, with a fixed
retirement benefit independent of earnings. In
2002, the basic benefit was $50.33 per month
per year of service and was topped up by a
bonus of $22 per month per year of service.
This bonus is not included in our calculation
of the initial benefit, but is incorporated into
the present value calculations.
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￿ Individuals may receive benefits without
actuarial reduction at 52 with a 75 factor.
￿ Conditions under which reduced benefits are
available was not clear at the time this model
was developed. It is assumed that reduced
benefits may be collected at age 52, reduced by
5 percent for every year the individual is below
the 75 factor.
￿ The model assumes pension benefits are
indexed to inflation.
3. Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP)
￿ Modeled here is a simplified version of the
plan.
￿ Individuals may draw benefits as early as age
50.
￿ They are eligible for a full pension (no
actuarial reduction) if they reach an 85 factor
(age plus years of service), reach 35 years of
service, or reach age 65.
￿ The formula for the basic benefit is two
percent x years service x highest paid salary
(noting actual pensions depend on five years of
highest earnings).
￿ The actuarial reduction is 2.5 percent for each
point missing from the 85 factor, or 5 percent
per year until age 65, whichever is less.
￿ OTPP is partially integrated with the
Canada/Quebec Pension Plan. Regardless of
age of take-up or retirement, benefits are
reduced by the amount of 0.45 percent x years
of service x lesser of the five-year average
YMPE and earnings.
4. Federal Public Service Pension Plan (PSPP)
￿ The minimum age for pension take-up is 50.
￿ Non-reduced pensions are available from 55
with at least 30 years of pensionable service or
from 60 (regardless of seniority).
￿ This is a defined-benefit plan. The basic
unreduced benefit is 2 percent x number of
years of pensionable service (maximum 35
years) x highest earnings (average of 5 highest
years is used in practice, but not in this
model).
￿ If the individual is between 50 and 54 with
less than 25 years of seniority, his/her pension
is reduced by 5 percent per year under age 60.
￿ If the individual retires between 50 and 54
with 25 years of seniority, his/her pension is
reduced by 5 percent per year under 30 years
of service.
￿ If the individual is between 55 and 59 with
less than 25 years of seniority, the pension is
reduced by 5 percent per year under age 60.
￿ If the individual is between 55 and 59 with 25
to 29 years of seniority, the pension is reduced
by 5 percent per year under 30 years of service.
￿ PSPP is integrated with CPP/QPP. Regardless
of age of take-up, benefits are reduced at age
65, the reduction amounts to 0.007 x number
of years service x lesser of average YMPE or
earnings.
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